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INTRODUCTION
In 2007, the Fondation pour le droit continental, or the Civil Law
Initiative, was established in France for the purpose of supporting and
fostering the influence of European private law throughout the world.
Among other projects, the Civil Law Initiative sought to encourage “legal
Copyright 2021, by ALAIN A. LEVASSEUR.
* Professor Emeritus, Herman Moyse, Sr. Professor of Law, Paul M.
Hebert Law Center, Louisiana State University.
1. An article somewhat similar to this one was previously written in French
for publication in the Mélanges en l’honneur du professeur Michel Grimaldi
(Festschrift), in honor of Grimaldi as an exceptional and tireless “oracle” of the
civil (or Continental) law. Michel Grimaldi is now Professor of Law Emeritus
(University of Paris II); he is a former President of the Association Henri Capitant
and a former Director of the Fondation pour le Droit Continental. The Louisiana
legal community, the Louisiana Section of the Association H. Capitant, and his
many Louisiana friends owe Michel Grimaldi an immense debt of gratitude. Many
grateful thanks to Seth Brostoff, Foreign, Comparative and International Law
Librarian (LSU). Seth’s extensive and incisive research contributed substantially
to the English version of this Article. His integrity is the reason why his name
does not appear as a co-author.
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professionals from Romano-Germanic legal systems to express their views
in international forums, which concern over two-thirds of the world’s
countries, i.e. 56.4% of global GDP and 60% of global population.”2
While not expressly defining droit continental, the Foundation’s early
promotional literature emphasized that “Continental law is characterized
by statutes and codification,” or “the systematic and rational collection of
rules of law into official compilations, such as civil or commercial codes.”3
The Foundation further observed that “almost all Member States of the
European Union belong to the continental law family.”4 Based on these
excerpts, it is an easy step to make in identifying the Foundation’s
conception of “Continental law” with the civil law tradition, the adjective
“Continental” referring implicitly to la Manche, the English Channel, as a
“legal-geographic” border marking off the insular “common law of
England” from “the civil law of the Continent.”
On the other side of the “civilian Atlantic,” the relationship between
civil law identity and code-making has great significance. Louisiana is the
only U.S. state whose private law is based on Continental law.
Codification has assumed a crucial place in the state’s legal
historiography. For many legal scholars, the story of the state’s civil law
tradition begins, and ends, with the codification of Louisiana’s prestatehood mix of Roman, Spanish, and French law.5 In fact, the Tulane
Law Review’s very first article, John Henry Wigmore’s “Louisiana: The
Story of Its Legal System,” published in 1916, is characteristic of local
civilian folklore.6 While presuming to tell the story of the civil law’s
triumph in Louisiana, Dean Wigmore’s account abruptly concludes with
the adoption of the state’s second civil code in 1825.7 For the famous
scholar of American evidence law, codification marked the denouement,
if not the exhaustion, of Louisiana’s civilian identity. Wigmore and later
2. FONDATION POUR LE DROIT CONTINENTAL: CIVIL LAW INITIATIVE,
https://www.fondation-droitcontinental.org/en/ [https://perma.cc/YP7V-RDE4]
(last visited Nov. 5, 2020).
3. LE DROIT CONTINENTAL, CONTINENTAL LAW (2011), available at
www.fondation-droitcontinental.org [https://perma.cc/YP7V-RDE4].
4. Id.
5. For an example of Louisiana codification folklore, see Symeon C.
Symeonides, An Introduction to the Romanist Tradition in Louisiana: One Day
in the Life of Louisiana Law, 56 LA. L. REV. 249 (1995) (celebrating Digest of
1808 as triumph of civil law over common law). See also John T. Hood, Jr., A
Crossroad in Louisiana History, 22 LA. L. REV. 709 (1962) (similar account).
6. John H. Wigmore, Louisiana: The Story of Its Legal System, 1 SO. L. Q.
1 (1916), reprinted in 90 TUL. L. REV. 529 (2016).
7. Id. at 15.
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historians’ neglect of other aspects of the civil law tradition in Louisiana
is understandable. After all, the state’s first two civil codes, the Digest of
1808 and the Civil Code of 1825, were the primary vehicles for preserving
the civil law tradition in Louisiana, and what law was not codified by 1825
was quickly Americanized.8 Much like the Civil Law Initiative’s
definition of “Continental law,” codification and civil law are two
concepts difficult to disentangle in the Louisiana lawyer’s imagination.
I. CIVILIAN LEGISLATION: THE ART OF RATIONAL CODIFICATION
In Gérard Cornu’s Dictionary of the Civil Code, the “scientific
meaning” of a code is described as being a “consistent body of rules
governing a specific field; a body of legal rules in a given field, stemming
from the compilation and arrangement of rules relating to it (usually
according to a systematic organization).”9
Likewise, under the title “Notions of ‘Code’ and ‘Codification,’”
Professor Jean-Louis Bergel writes:
As Portalis was saying, codification is nothing else than the “spirit
of method applied to legislation.” In the broadest sense, a code is
a gathering of texts of written law in a coherent whole. . . . It is a
coherent and consistent aggregate of texts encompassing,
according to a systematic outline, all the rules that relate to a
subject matter and emanating from legislative works or from
regulations. . . . The classical codification called “real” or
“substantive” of the Napoleonic type does not consist only in the
gathering together of a certain number of texts. It is not a mere
compilation. It is a creative work and a work aiming at updating a
whole subject matter, that gathers together, under a common
inspiration, traditional rules and new rules in a coherent structure
designed to establish or to update a juridical order.10
Importantly, Professor Bergel is careful to distinguish the modern
civilian conception of codification from its common law competitor, the
code qua Restatement or mere consolidation. Reflecting on the modern
civilian approach, Bergel notes that:
8. See generally VERNON VALENTINE PALMER, THE LOUISIANA CIVILIAN
EXPERIENCE: CRITIQUES OF CODIFICATION IN A MIXED JURISDICTION (2005).
9. Scientific Meaning, GÉRARD CORNU, VOCABULAIRE JURIDIQUE;
DICTIONARY OF THE CIVIL CODE, LEXISNEXIS (10th ed. 2014).
10. JEAN-LOUIS BERGEL, MÉTHODOLOGIE JURIDIQUE 322–23 (2001)
(translated from French by this author).
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This type of codification has not been received in the common law
countries. . . . There does not exist a true “code” in England . . . . In
the United States, Canada, India and, broadly speaking, in the
English-speaking countries, the “compilations” referred to as
“Codes,” the revised statutes or consolidated laws, are not true
codes in the European sense of the word.11
According to Bergel, “in common law countries, Codes are considered, in
general, as mere works of ‘consolidation,’ of restatement.”12 The difference
with common law codification (and pre-Napoleonic civilian codes) is
therefore both a matter of degree: the ambition of comprehensiveness, as
well as quality: the presence of a rational and unifying logic otherwise
absent from projects of common-law restatement. In the apposite words of
the Argentine legal scholar, Julio Cueto-Rua, “Codification is a technique
which facilitates the achievement of a high degree of consistency and the
enactment of broad, logically unifying, general propositions.”13
The insights of Louisiana’s fellow mixed jurisdiction jurists are
particularly helpful in emphasizing the dynamism and complexity of
civilian codification in a world of common-law compilation. The
economic nature of civilian codification, with its conserving, creating, and
organizing functions, suggests a teleological ethos behind the spirit of
code-drafting. Paul Crépeau, a comparatist of worldwide reputation and
prominent civil law scholar from Quebec, wrote:
[A] Civil Code is a comprehensive work that conjures up quite
naturally the idea of a gathering of diverse elements that make up
a whole. . . . A Code is more than a mere material collection of
disparate texts: codes and compilations are two different things. A
Civil Code represents an organic whole, well-ordered, structured
and laid out of substantial matters of private law. . . . A Civil Code
is, par excellence, a work of foresight and planning in this sense
that it has for its purpose and mission to devise, on the one hand,
the organization of institutions essential to ‘civil’ life . . . and, on
the other hand, to lay down all the reciprocal rights and duties of
persons living in society. A Civil Code is a work of
simplification. . . . The simplicity of the Civil Code manifests
itself . . . in the care of formulating the rule of law, addressed to
the ‘prudent citizen,’ in a precise language, simple and plain in
11. Id. at 323.
12. Id.
13. Julio C. Cueto-Rua, The Future of the Civil Law, 37 LA. L. REV. 645, 646
(1977).
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avoiding as much as possible the professional jargon.14
Comprehensiveness, simplicity, and precision; these are crucial
qualities of codification in a mixed jurisdiction such as Quebec (or
Louisiana), where Anglo-American law offers a tantalizing menu of
options for “filling gaps” in a civil code, a veritable “attractive nuisance”
for the pragmatist and a “dam waiting to be breeched” for the anxious
purist.15 The preliminary provision of the Quebec Civil Code of 1991
explains that the flexibility of the code’s general legal principles ensures
the continuing vitality of the pre-code civilian order rather than weakening
it: “The Civil Code comprises a body of rules which, in all matters within
the letter, spirit or object of its provisions, lays down the jus commune,
expressly or by implication.”16 A civil code may therefore serve not only
as a set of general legal principles regulating future disputes but even as a
bulwark for preserving an entire legal culture.17
II. SOME EARLY COMMON LAW PERSPECTIVES ON CIVILIAN CODES
In a cultural milieu of skepticism concerning legislative solutions to
discrete legal problems, modern civil codes and their ambitious aspirations
to regulate all of private law according to a preconceived blueprint were
probably not likely to impress common-law lawyers, even those
sympathetic to law reform. The evidence of the 19th century tends to
confirm this assumption. Soon after the promulgation of the Code
Napoléon, Chancellor Kent in New York complained that the French code
had failed to achieve anything like the comprehensiveness and selfsufficiency advertised by its admirers. Kent apparently preferred the
ancien droit commentaries of pre-codified French law, which was so
popular in the United States after the American Revolution:
The code Napoleon, in respect to the contract of sale, and in
respect to all other contracts, seems to be in a great degree a
14. P.-A. Crépeau, Réflexion sur la codification du droit privé, 38 OSGOODE
HALL L.J. 267, 289–91 (2000).
15. Cf. T.B. Smith, The Preservation of the Civilian Tradition, in CIVIL LAW
IN THE MODERN WORLD 16 (Athanassios N. Yiannopoulos ed., 1965) (civilian
purist warning against use of Anglo-American law’s terminology and categories
as “alien” jurisprudence “pouring” through “breaches” in civilian cultural
boundary).
16. Civil Code of Québec, prel. (1991).
17. As in Louisiana. See Symeonides, supra note 5 (discussing Louisiana
codification as a conservative political act to preserve Roman civil law rather than
break with legal past).
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concise abridgment or summary of the writings of Pothier. The
utility of the latter, and their great merit in learning, perspicuity,
and accuracy of illustration, are far from being superseded or
eclipsed by the simplicity and beauty of the code. The aid of the
French civilians of the former school has been found as
indispensable as ever. The Code Napoleon, and Code de
Commerce, deal only in general rules and regulations. They are
not sufficiently minute and provisional to solve, without judicial
discussion, the endless questions that constantly arise in the
business of life.18
A few decades later, a very different critic, the English legal
philosopher John Austin, came to similarly negative conclusions about the
perceived failures of French codification:
[T]he judiciary law is, as it were, the nucleus around which the
statute law is formed. . . . The statute law is not a whole of itself,
but is formed or fashioned on the judiciary law, and tacitly refers
throughout to those leading terms and principles which are
expounded by the judiciary.—And hence, . . . arises the greatest
difficulty in the way of codification. For, in order to the exclusion
of the judiciary law, and to the making of the code a complete
body of law, the terms and principles of the judiciary must not be
assumed tacitly, but must be defined and expounded by the code
itself: A process which people may think an easy one—until they
come to try it. . . . [T]he statute law is not of itself complete, but
is merely a partial and irregular supplement to that judiciary law
which is the mass and bulk of the system.
. . .
[T]he question of codification is a question of time and place.
Speaking in abstract (or without reference to the circumstances of
a given community) there can be no doubt that a complete code is
better than a body of judiciary law: or is better than a body of law
partly consisting of judiciary law, and partly of statute law stuck
patchwise on a body of judiciary. . . . Are there men, then and
there, competent to the difficult task of successful codification? of
[sic] producing a code, which, on the whole, would more than
compensate the evil that must necessarily attend the change?
. . .
The first and most current objection to codification, is the
18. 2 JAMES KENT, COMMENTARIES ON AMERICAN LAW 397–98 n.(f) (vol.
1827).
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necessary incompleteness of a code. It is said that the individual
cases which may arise in fact or practice, are infinite; and that,
therefore, they cannot be anticipated, and provided for, by a body
of general rules. The objection (as applied to statute law generally)
is thus put by Lord Mansfield in the case of Omychund and
Barker. . . . “Cases of law depend upon occasions which give rise
to them. All occasions do not arise at once. A statute very seldom
can take in all cases. Therefore the common law that works itself
pure by rules drawn from the fountains of justice, is superior to an
act of parliament.”
. . .
In France and Prussia . . . the law does not possess that
compactness and accessibility, which are the main ends of codes
as such . . . .
[I]n France, the code is buried under a heap of subsequent
enactments of the legislature, and of judiciary law subsequently
introduced by the tribunals. . . .
. . .
The first glaring deficiency of the French code is the total want
of definitions of its technical terms and explanations of the leading
principles
and
distinctions
upon
which
it
is
founded. . . . Unless . . . the code contains a statement of leading
principles as well as details, the code itself does not furnish the
necessary guides to its own meaning; if those guides exist at all,
they exist en dehors of the code.
Now, of the necessity of explanations of the leading principles
and distinctions and of definitions of the technical terms, the
compilers of the French code had no idea. . . . [T]he French code
is not a body of law, or is not a body of law forming a substantive
whole. It is nothing but a loose abstract of the former law, or an
index to a body of law existing dehors itself. This very defect in
the French code is one principal cause of the fallacious brevity
which its injudicious admirers have frequently selected as a matter
of praise.19
In the early 20th century, Anglophone legal scholars explained
common lawyers’ aversion to codified legislation by identifying the
English nation’s conservatism as well as a “psychological”

19. 2 JOHN AUSTIN, LECTURES ON JURISPRUDENCE 681, 684–86, 689–90, 692
(3d ed. 1869).
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imperviousness to civilian models of legal methodology.20 These scholars
resorted both to ahistorical and largely cultural explanations, invoking in
particular the supposedly English habit of relying on experience or
inductive reasoning, in contrast to the Continent’s alleged predilection to
grand theorizing. In his 1937 essay, “What is the Common Law?,” Roscoe
Pound hypothesized that a deep philosophical chasm existed between
English and civilian methodologies, and he regarded cultural differences
as the best explanation for the former tradition’s relative neglect of
legislation:
The civilian is at his best in interpreting, developing and
applying written texts. . . .
In contrast the common-law lawyer is at his worst when
confronted with a legislative text. His technique is one of
developing and applying judicial experience. It is a technique of
finding the grounds of decision in the reported cases. It is a
technique of shaping and reshaping principles drawn from
recorded judicial decisions. Hence while to the civilian the oracles
of the law are academic teachers, the books of authority are
codes, . . . to the common-law lawyer the oracles are not teachers
but judges, the books of authority are reports of adjudicated
cases . . . .
If we think of the common law as a taught tradition of decision,
it is a tradition of applying judicial experience to the decision of
controversies. . . .
[B]ehind the characteristic doctrines and ideas and technique of
the common-law lawyer there is a significant frame of mind. It is
a frame of mind which habitually looks at things in the concrete,
not in the abstract; which puts its faith in experience rather than in
abstractions. . . . It is a frame of mind which is not ambitious to
deduce the decision for the case in hand from a proposition
formulated universally, as like as not by one who had never
conceived of the problem by which the tribunal is confronted. It is
the frame of mind behind the sure-footed Anglo-Saxon habit of
dealing with things as they arise instead of anticipating them by

20. See, e.g., Clarence J. Morrow, Louisiana Blueprint: Civilian Codification
and Legal Method for State and Nation, 17 TUL. L. REV. 351, 378 (1942) (“[O]nce
a typically English system developed and became firmly entrenched, the English
national character could be relied upon to defend and retain it to the bitter end.”).
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abstract universal formulas.21
Pound’s resort to deeply-entrenched philosophical differences as
causal explanations for legal diversity is implicit recognition that the
methodological and cultural differences between Europe’s two principal
legal traditions have proven persistent, pervasive, and, depending on one’s
attitude to predictions of legal convergence, perhaps intractable.
III. PORTALIS, AN ORACLE OF THE CIVIL LAW’S PERSPECTIVE
In his Discours préliminaire, a sort of drafters’ report to the French
Assemblies included with the Projet, Portalis articulated his view of the
creative collaboration between the lawmaker, as the primary source of law,
and case law and doctrine, as secondary sources of law, in the application
of the new French code.22
Nineteenth-century common-law lawyers such as Kent and Austin
would have found some enlightening and wise statements in Portalis’s
comments that would have both aroused their sympathies and emptied
their false dichotomy of “legislator versus judge” of any substance.
Indeed, these commentators would have found much to admire in
Portalis’s profound statements to the Assemblies about the role of judicial
practice and custom, pronouncements inherited from this civilian oracle’s
own experiences as lawyer, judge, and lead member of the French code’s
drafting commission:
Legislation is not a pure act of power; it is an act of wisdom,
justice, and reason. The legislator does not exercise authority as
much as he serves a sacred office. He must not forget that
legislation is made for men, and that men are not made for
legislation; . . . while it is possible in a new undertaking to
calculate the advantages a theory offers, it is impossible to
anticipate all the drawbacks that practice alone can reveal . . . .
. . .
A host of things is thus necessarily left to the province of custom,
the discussion of learned men, and the decision of judges.
The role of legislation is to set, by taking a broad approach, the
general propositions of the law, to establish principles which will
be fertile in application, and not to get down to the details of
21. Roscoe Pound, What Is the Common Law, 4 U. CHI. L. REV. 176, 186–87
(1937).
22. See Discours préliminaire, in PROJET DE CODE CIVIL iii (An. VIII
[1800]).
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questions which may arise in particular instances.
It is for the judge and the jurist, imbued with the general spirit of
the laws, to direct their application.23
Legislation being “an act of wisdom, justice, and reason,” and “being
made for men,” Portalis claims that the code must leave interpretation “by
way of doctrine” to judges and jurists imbued with the spirit of the laws.
They will direct the laws’ application. In doing so, civilian judges and
jurists, like their common law brethren, must rely on the culture, values,
and beliefs of the people when searching the “spirit of the laws.” In
Portalis’s view of civilian legal methodology, human experience, judicial
and extrajudicial, is not a separate reservoir of legal knowledge at odds
with the code’s general principles, but reliable evidence of the correct
application of codal provisions and the means of their gradual and
continuous renovation.
IV. CIVILIAN LEGAL METHODOLOGY: A TRIANGLE
According to Portalis, legislation, doctrinal writing, and case law are
like three angles of a “triangle” of legal methodology. Statutory law or
legislation, the top angle, jurisprudence or cases and legal writing or
doctrine as the bottom two angles, exist in both the civil law and common
law traditions. However, the legal culture, values, ideology, and
institutions prevailing in these two legal traditions have driven them to
elaborate two different approaches in ranking their sources of law and in
devising their working relationship. As regards the civil law, the most
authentic and reliable understanding of its sources of law and their
working relationship is found, once again, in Portalis’s report to the French
Assemblies, in their capacity as lawmakers. Here are some of Portalis’s
instructions to the “lawmaker”:
[W]e find in the codes of civilized nations the kind of meticulous
attention which covers a multiplicity of particular issues and
seems to make an art of reason itself.
. . .
We also kept clear of the dangerous ambition of wanting to
forecast and regulate everything. . . .
No matter what we do, positive laws could never entirely replace
the use of natural reason in the affairs of life. . . . [T]he legislator
cannot possibly provide for all eventualities.
23. See Alain Levasseur, Code Napoléon or Code Portalis? 43 TUL. L. REV.
762, 767–69 (1969) (translation of Discours préliminaire).
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. . .
In any case, how can one fetter the movement of time? . . . How
can one know and calculate in advance what only experience can
reveal? Can a forecast ever encompass matters that thought cannot
reach?
A code, however complete it may seem, is hardly finished before
a thousand unexpected issues come to face the judge. For laws,
once drafted, remain as they were written. Men on the contrary,
are never at rest . . . .24
Turning then to the relationship that a civilian “code” assumes
between the lawmaker on one side and judges and jurists on the other side,
Portalis makes clear that:
[I]n all civilized nations, we always witness the formation,
alongside the temple of enacted laws and under the legislator’s
supervision, of a repository of maxims, decisions, and doctrinal
writings which is daily refined by the practitioners and their
clashing debates in court, which steadily grows as all acquired
knowledge is added to it, and which has always been regarded as
the true supplement of legislation.
. . .
[I]f there is no precise provision on a particular matter, then an
ancient custom, constant and well established, an unbroken line of
similar decisions, an opinion, or an accepted maxim takes the
place of enacted law. . . .
All this presumes compilations, collections, treatises, and
numerous volumes of research and analysis.
. . .
It would thus be erroneous to think that there could be a body of
laws that would provide in advance for all possible cases and yet
at the same time would be within the grasp of the humblest citizen.
In the present state of our societies, it is very fortunate that the
study of case law is a science that attracts talent, enhances selfrespect, and awakens emulation. A whole class of men then
dedicates itself to this science . . . .
It is very fortunate that we have compendia . . . so that it
becomes necessary, in some way, to judge today much as we
judged yesterday, and that there be no variations between judicial
decisions other than those resulting from the progress of
enlightenment and the force of circumstances.
24. See id. at 768–69.
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. . .
The legislator must pay attention to case law; it can enlighten
him, and he can correct it; but there must be a body of case law. . . .
[O]ne cannot dispense with case law any more than he can
dispense with legislation. . . . It is for experience gradually to fill
up the gaps we leave. The Codes of nations are the fruit of the
passage of time; but properly speaking, we do not make them.25
In 1901, the French law professor Adhémar Esmein, writing in the first
issue of the Revue Trimestrielle de Droit Civil, explained in more practical
terms how these three sources of law feed on each other and how they
merge into one voice, the voice of “one law,” the voice of jurisprudence:
[T]he judge, to set down his decision and his thinking, has in our
country a particular form to which he is tied. It is not the English
system in which the magistrate, putting down the law, pronounces
freely and orally his judgment . . . in which, in principle, each
judge, if there are several, gives in turn his independent
judgment . . . . The judgment of a French court is a written verdict,
the collective work of the court, which must suit all the members
of the bench, preceded by considerations in which the thinking,
necessarily compressed, is kept to the briefest and most
concentrated expression. For all these reasons the interpretation of
the Civil Code by the tribunals could not always be the same as
that of the professors and writers. It is thus thta [sic] case law has
formed beside doctrine.
. . . Case law in its entirety, with partial divergences, such as
doctrinal writings also offer, forms a true system . . . . That comes
only from the powerful and healthy instinct which pushes
administrations and established bodies to conform their future
conduct to their past conduct. . . .
. . .
M. Labbe . . . inaugurated one of the first scientific and detailed
annotations of important decisions, giving them a value and scope
that they had never had before. . . .
. . .
[I]t is not a dead legislation which the pages of the Civil Code
contain. It is a living law . . . . [I]t has transformed itself and will
transform itself even further. These transformations could only
have been produced (where the lawmaker did not intercede anew)
by respecting the ancient texts, by softening them through
25. See id. at 769–73.
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interpretation; but they were produced in numbers and in
depth. . . . The written law had to adapt to the new milieu. Now,
these transformations of the civil law, what noted them down and
at the same time consecrated them? It is case law. Case law is the
true expression of the civil law; it is the real and positive law, as
long as it has not been changed. Thus, it, as much as the civil code
itself, must be studied directly and scientifically. . . .
. . .
The right and duty of every jurist is to fight, with all his strength,
against all case law he considers wrong or bad. The courts, fallible
like any assembly of men, the Supreme Court itself cannot be
obstinate if the solid and incontestable demonstration of their
mistake is supplied. Therein lies an important and delicate task
which falls upon doctrinal writers. . . .
. . .
[T]he scattered decisions rendered by the tribunals, on the
various institutions which the civil law includes, form a system in
which all parts fit.
. . . But this general harmony, with its subordinate irregularities,
who can formulate and demonstrate its existence? Not the
tribunals; they supply and cut the materials, but are not charged
with constructing the building. It is the theoreticians, the men of
learning; it is for the study and the rostrum of the professor.26
As previously stated, in a civil law system, this “trio” of sources of
law can be described as forming the three angles and sides of a triangle.
They are, as such, in a relationship in which a statute or a code, having
preeminence of place, lies on the top of the triangle, while jurisprudence
and doctrine form the bases, or the bottom angles of the triangle. This
triangular relationship is such that “alongside the temple of enacted law”
exists a myriad of “compilations, collections, treatises, and numerous
volumes of research and analysis.”27 In the words of Esmein, the harmony
between the three sources of law is achieved by the tribunals who “supply
and cut the materials, but are not charged with constructing the building.
It is theoreticians, the men of learning; it is for the study and the rostrum

26. A. Esmein, La jurisprudence et la doctrine, 1 REVUE TRIMESTRIELLE DE
DROIT CIV. 5–19 (1902) (translated by M. Shael Herman, Excerpts from a
Discourse on the Code Napoleon by Portalis and Case Law and Doctrine by A.
Esmein, 18 LOY. L. REV. 23, 30–35 (1971–72)).
27. Levasseur, supra note 23, at 770.
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of the professor” to perfect this harmony.28 As Roscoe Pound
acknowledged:
[I]t is important to keep in mind that the methods of civilians have
been chiefly determined by the circumstance that the modern
Roman law is, and from its very beginning has been, a law made
in the universities. The oracles of the civil law are not judges and
practicing lawyers. They are teachers. The great repositories of the
law are treatises and commentaries upon texts, not reports of
judicial decisions. Moreover, the traditional technique of the
civilian is one of developing the grounds of decision from written
texts.29
A few years later, Roscoe Pound added:
From the time that the Law of Citations gave legislative authority
to the writings of the great jurisconsults, [the civilian] has thought
of the form of the law as typically that of a code, ancient and
modern. His method has been one of logical development and
logical exposition of supposedly universal enacted propositions.
His whole tradition is one of the logical handling of written texts.
In contrast, the common-law lawyer is at his worst when confronted
with a legislative text.30
CONCLUSION
It would appear proper to conclude, from the above attempt at making
a rapprochement between Portalis and Pound, that the latter, Roscoe
Pound, had accurately understood and appreciated the originality, the
inner wisdom, the writing skill, and the artistic drafting technique of the
process of “codification” as evidenced in the Code civil des français also
known as the Code Napoléon. The following thoughts expressed by Pound
encapsulate the acumen of his understanding of “codification,” as a new
form of legislating by relying on judges and doctrine to “grasp[] the true
sense of the laws, applying them . . . and supplementing them in those
cases which the laws have not provided for.”31
Pound emphasized that:
28.
29.
(1924).
30.
31.
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the civilian reasons by analogy from a statutory provision the
same as from any other legal rule. Thus, it is as easy for him to
administer justice by a code as it is difficult—I had almost said
impossible—for us. To him a series of code sections involves the
same problems that a series of decisions involves for us. He fails
to understand how we can treat the latter as giving a series of legal
rules. We fail to see how he can administer justice by means of
the former in the multitude of cases that do come within the four
corners of the text.32
. . .
With us a precedent will govern a case “on all fours.” But it may
do much more. We distinguish it and limit it, or we extend its
application and develop its principle. The French, on the other
hand, think only of a definite proposition as established by a
settled course of judicial decision. Neither a decision nor a course
of decision can lay down a general rule. . . . In other words, the art
of working with the materials of the legal system is no less
different than the content of the materials themselves.33
32. Id. at 769:
No matter what we do, positive laws could never entirely replace the use
of natural reason in the affairs of life. . . . [T]he legislator cannot possibly
provide for all eventualities. . . . In any case, how can one fetter the
movement of time? . . . How can one know and calculate in advance what
only experience can reveal? . . . A host of things is thus necessarily left
to the . . . discussion of learned men and the decision of judges. The role
of legislation is to set, by taking a broad approach, the general
propositions of the law, to establish principles which will be fertile in
application, and not to get down to the details of questions which may
arise in particular instances.
33. Compare Roscoe Pound, The Theory of Judicial Decision I. The
Materials of Judicial Decision, 36 HARV. L. REV. 641, 647–49 (1923), as quoted
below, with Levasseur, supra note 23, at 772:
[L]egislation governs everyone; it considers men en masse, never as
individuals; it must not interfere in individual matters or lawsuits . . . .
Magistrates would lose their function, and the lawmaker, fettered by
details, would soon be nothing more than a magistrate. . . . There is a
science for lawmakers, as there is for judges; and the former does not
resemble the latter. The legislator’s science consists in finding in each
subject the principles most favorable to the common good; the judge’s
science is to put these principles into effect, to diversify them, and to
extend them, by means of wise and reasoned application, to private
causes; to examine closely the spirit of the law when the letter kills . . . .
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